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Abstract 
The paper discusses recent trends in age at marriage for women 
in Malaysia and Japan. Age at marriage is hypothesized to respond signifi­
cantly to changes in male and female wage rates, schooling, unearned wealth, 
and family background. Using household data from Malaysia and Japan, age 
at marriage is regressed on these socioeconomic variables and an exogenous 
time trend variable. We find considerable support for the relevance of 
economic variables and family background on age at marriage as well as 
evidence of a strong exogenous positive trend over time in age at marriage 
in both countries. 
1 
Age at marriage is one of the most important life-cycle decisions that 
men and women in all cultures face. Where pre-marital sexual relationships 
are taboo or infrequent, marriage--or socially sanctioned cohabitation--signifies 
the beginning of a woman's exposure to pregnancy risk; changes in nuptiality 
patterns are often associated with changes in population growth. In most 
countries, marriage patterns have been changing quite markedly over the last 
thirty years; in general, a downward trend in the percentage of the population 
married at every age and an upward trend in age at marriage have been discerned. 
In Asia, for example, Malaysia and Japan experienced significant changes in 
_both age at marriage and the proportion of women ever-married. The 1966 
and 1974 ~alaysia Fertility and Family Surveys (MFFS) present striking dif­
ferences in age at marriage patterns. The mean age at marriage rose from 
16.6 to 17.9 for the cohort of 15-24 year old married women, from 17.8 to 
19.5 for the cohort of 25-34 year old women, and from 17.5 to 18.8 for the 
cohort of 35-44 year old women. Comparing Census data and the Fertility 
Survey from 1947 to 1974, clear declines in proportions of women ever-married 
or currently married are indicated in every age group. Table l presents these 
data. Table 2 presents comparable information for Japan. In Japan as in 
Malaysia, the proportion marrying has declined for the younger cohorts of 
women. For the youngest cohort, 15-19 years old, the percentage ever married 
has fallen from 3.4 in 1940 to 1.4 in 1975. For women 20 to 25~ this percentage 
has dropped from 45 in 1940 to 31 in 1975. The change is much less significant 
in the older cohorts, with a decline from 85 percent to 79 percent of all 
25-29 year olds ever-married during this period. Also, in contrast with 
Malaysia, the proportion ever-marrying by age 39 has changed very little; 
the shift in Japan is characterized by a change in the timing of marriage 
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rather than the choice to ever-marry. Although the proportion of women 25-29 
who are ever married is the same in both countries, there are marked differences 
between the countries, in the fractions of younger women married. Eight times 
as many Malaysian women 15-19 and nearly twice as many Malaysian women 20-25 
are married relative to their counterparts in Japan. One would not be surprised 
then to find that the mean age at marriage for all women marrying in 1977 in 
Japan is 25. (increasing from 24 in 1970) while the mean age at marriage for 
all women in Malaysia in 1974 is 18. 
Two approaches commonly explain these marriage patterns. The first 
the demographic approach--isolates a trend line in the data, and mathematically 
fits marriage patterns to a "standard" curve (Coale, 1971). This approach 
assigns little role to changing socioeconomic conditions in determining age 
at marriage and the proportion ever-married. The second approach--the be­
havioral approach--emphasizes the role of socioeconomic conditions in explaining 
the observed behavior, while virtually ignoring historical trends in the data. 
Hogan (1978), Keeley (1977, 1979), and Becker (1973, 1974) have contributed 
significantly· to this approach by offering alternative explanations of marriage 
behavior. 
Hogan analyzes data on United States males. His results reject the 
theory that characteristics of the family of origin (family structure, father's 
education and income)·are important determinants of age at marriage. He does 
find that age at marriage is significantly related to participation in time­
intensive activities such as the military, college, and the labor force. Cohort 
and race variables are also important in measuring differences in marriage. 
Hogan fails, however, to adequately specify a model which explains why these 
TABLE 1. EVER-MARRIED AND CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AS A PROPORTION OF ALL WOMEN, 
MALAYSIA, 1947-1975 
(percent) 









Current Ever- Currently Ever- Currently Ever- Currently Ever-
Age Married Married Married Married Married Married Married 
15-19 11 10 16 15 37 35 42 
20-24 50 48 57 55 79 75 87 
25-29 79 76 86 83 94 90 96 
30-34 90 85 94 90 98 91 98 
35-39 94 82 98 86 99 81 98 










TABLE 2. EVER-MARRIED AND CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AS A PROPORTION OF 
ALL WOMEN, BY FIVE-YEAR AGE GROUPS: 1950-1975 
(percent) 
1975 1960 1950 1940 
Current Age Ever- Currently Ever- Currently Ever- Ever-
Group Married Married Married Married Married Married 
15-19 1.4 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.3 3.4 
20-24 31 31 28 28 32 45 
25-29 79 78 82 80 79 85 
30-34 92 90 93 90 90 94 
35-39 95 91 94 90 94 97 
Source: The Population Census of Japan,1940, 1950, 1960, and 1975. Japan.
Prime Minister's Office. Bureau of Statistics. 
5 
variables are important to the marriage decision, and his estimation procedure 
is ad hoc for this reason. In addition, Hogan's conclusion that family back­
gronnd can be ignored in further analysis is not entirely supported by his 
data and is not supported in other cultures. In his analysis of whites, he 
does find that father's participation in the labor force, mother's education, 
and farm origin are significant determinants of age at marriage. 
The theoretical work by Keeley and Becker views marriage as a choice 
variable and can, therefore, offer some insight into why socioeconomic variables 
are important in the marriage decision. Keeley models the process of searching 
for a mate, emphasizing the costs of search. His model predicts that the net 
gain to marriage for women will fall and the age at marriage will rise with 
increases in the female wage relative to the male wage. With higher wages, 
the cost of searching for a mate increases as more time is devoted to search 
rather than to market work. Search is prolonged and less intensive so that 
marriage is delayed. 
Becker's theory of marriage predicts that marriage occurs if the 
benefits from marriage exceed the costs. The economic gains accruing to 
marriage derive from the production of "household commodities" such as meals, 
companionship, and children. If married households can produce these commodities 
at a lower cost than single households, then individuals will choose to marry. 
The gains from marriage, therefore, depend on wage and non-wage income when 
married and single, the prices of purchased inputs used in the production 
of household commodities, and the efficiency of household production. Becker 
does not empirically test his model, but Friedan (1974) does and finds some 
support for the importance of economic variables in determining the proportion 
of females married. In particular, if the difference in the male and female 
wage rates is large, the proportion of women marrying increases. In addition, 
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an increase in wealth or a technological change in the home results in an 
increase in the proportion of women married. 
The Becker model is not a model of the age at marriage but of the 
decision to ever marry. The Becker model was extended to incorporate the 
age at marriage by Anderson and Hill (1980). In this case, if marital 
dissolution is rare or remarriage after divorce is common and preceded by 
a short lag, then the fraction of the lifetime married represents the 
probability of ever-marrying. Age at marriage is, therefore, a decreasing 
function of the probability of ever-~arrying; any variables which increase 
this probability of marrying decrease the age at marriage and vice versa. 
In this paper, we use data from Tokyo, Japan and Peninsular Malaysia 
to estimate the determinants of age at marriage. Our approach is based on 
the model developed by Anderson and Hill (1980). Marital dissolution is 
rare in Japan with fewer than three percent of all married women over thirty 
ever divorcing; the model is appropriate. In Malaysia, divorce is unusually 
common for an Asian country, but remarriage after divorce is the norm and 
the lag between divorce and remarriage is short. (See the Malaysian Fertility 
and Family Survey, 1974, for more detailed information on marital dissolution.) 
Although the age at marriage model is less appropriate in this setting, the 
speed at which women remarry very likely mitigates any inconsistencies. 
We view marriage as a choice variable which we expect to respond 
significantly to changes in wages, income, and other socioeconomic characteristics 
of the populations. In particular, we expect that the wife's wage and the 
husband's wage will be positively related to her age at marriage. As the 
wife's wage increases, her market earning power increases. At the same time, 
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this change will make time in the home more expensive. If wives spend 
relatively more time in the home than the market compared to single women, 
rising wages will result in delayed marriages. An increase in the husband's 
market wage has two effects. First, it raises the cost of the husband's 
time in the home proudction. This increase will raise the cost of goods 
produced with the husband's time, reduce the benefits to marriage, and 
consequently increase the age at marriage. Second, the wage increase 
will provide more income to the household. This effect will lower the 
age at marriage since the gains to marriage will rise. The net effect 
of an increase in the husband's wage will depend on the relative strength 
of these two effects. 
The unearned income of both spouses will also significantly influence 
the age at marriage. If the wife has independent wealth from an inheritance, 
for example, her own resources increase, and she may choose to delay marriage. 
Conversely, the husband's unearned incone will raise marital income relative 
to the income of the single woman and make marriage a more desirable alternative. 
Schooling is closely associated with wealth accumulation, tastes, and efficiency 
in both the home and in the labor market. Schooling may also represent an 
intergenerational transfer of wealth. An increase in the wife's or husband's 
schooling may raise or lower the age at marriage. We are also interested in 
testing for the pre•. 1::nce of an exogenous trend in age at marriage as hypothesized 
by demographers. The estimating equations incorporate both the relevant socio­
economic variables and the trend over time. Significance of these variables 
lends support to both approaches to analyzing changing marriage patterns. 
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Data And Methodology 
The data for this analysis are obtained from two surveys. The 1976 
Nalaysian Family Life Survey collected by the Rand Corporation is used for 
the Malaysian estimation. The survey includes 1262 households in Peninsular 
Halaysia, each containing at least one ever-married woman younger than age 
50. The sample is representative of the Malaysian population; thirty-nine 
percent of the households are Chinese, 12 percent are Indian, 48 percent are 
Malay, and the remaining one percent are of other indigenous groups. The 
sample used in this study is restricted to those households in which 
the husband is present. The Japanese data are drawn from a 1975 survey of 
1405 women aged 20 to 29 in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. The data were 
collected by the Japanese National Institute for Vocational Research and 
include information on family background and socioeconomic characteristics 
as well as marital status. 
Our estimation procedure uses ordinary least squares regressions of 
the age at marria;·~~ nf women on socioeconomic variables and an exogenous time 
trend. The socioeconomic variables are the wage rates of the husband and wife, 
unearned income, schooling, and family background characteristics. Table 3 
presents the means and standard deviations of these variables. As expected 
from the discussion of aggregate trends in both countries, the mean age at 
marriage in Japan is much higher than in 11alaysia: 24 versus 19. 
For the Malysian and Japanese data, the wage rates of the wives and 
husbands are imputed from estimating equations. For the husbands and the 
working wives, the wage rate is imputed from earnings functions in which the 
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TABLE 3. SAMPLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF AGE AT MARRIAGE, SOCIO-
ECONOMIC, AND FAMILY BACKGROUND VARIABLES: MALAYSIA AND JAPANa 
Malaysia 
Age at marriage 18. 7 
(4 .02) 
ln Wife's value of timeb 1.51 
(Malaysian dollars per hour and yen per hour) (0.62) 
Wife's years of schooling 3.84 
(3 .93) 
ln Husband's earnings 2.29 
(Malaysian dollars per hour and yen per year) (0 .57) 
Husband's years of schooling - Malaysia 5. 71 
(4.09) 
Husband's schooling - Japan 
(Dummy variable =l if completed junior high school) 
Present value of wealth - Malaysia 440.62 
(Malaysian dollars) (2345 .18) 
ln Father's income - Japan 
(yen per year) 
Mother's schooling - Japan 
(Dwnmy variable =l if completed junior high school) 
Malaysian wife is Chinese 0.38 
(Dummy =l) 
Malaysian wife is Indian 0.12 
(Dummy = 1) 
Market center residence - Malaysian 0.20 
(Dummy = 1) 
Other urban area residence - Malaysian 0.22 
(Dwnmy = 1) 
Year of marriage 1961 















bThe 1975 exchange rate was 293.8 yen per dollar in Japan and 2.59 Malay­
sian dollars per U.S. dollar. 
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log of earnings is regressed on characteristics of the individual reflectinr­
the amount of human capital accumulated: experience, schooling, and for 
Malaysie,ethnic and location characteristics. Due to unfortunate differ­
ences in the employment status question in the two surveys, we could not 
define the labor force in Japan and Malaysia identically. Therefore, the Ha­
laysian labor force is defined to include anyone regularly working for money 
or in-kind wages and may comprise women working in family businesses. For 
Japan, the labor force is defined in this study as the formal sector; a 
housewife producing home handicrafts is not included in our definition of 
the Japanese labor force. The estimating procedure the the estimating 
equations for husbands and working wives are presented in the Appendix. 
The wage rates of non-working wives are not imputed from the earnings 
functions of working wives. In Malaysia, 46 percent of the women are not 
regular workers; in Japan, 85 percent of the vomen manufacture home handicrafts 
or do not work. It is likely that these p,roups of women are non-randomly 
crawn from the sample of all women so that sample censoring is suspected if 
vages are imputed from a sample of vorkers only. We choose to estimate the 
value of non-market time for these non-working women separately. First, 
labor force participation is regressed on all variables determining the 
value of market time and the value of non-market time: experience, schooling, 
wealth, ethnic characteristics, location, and characteristics of the husband. 
From these estimates, the value of non-market time is easily derived. The 
description of this procedure and the results of the estimation are presented 
in the Appendix. The value of time for non-workers is imputed from these 
equations. 
To measure family background in Malaysia, ve include variables on ethnicity 
and urban or rural residency. The data set includes no data on characteristics 
of the wife or husband's family before marriage. The Japanese data, however, 
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provide detailed information on income of the wife's father and schooling of 
parents. The father's income is imputed from an estimating equation given 
in the Appendix; income is a function of education and occupation. The 
imputed income of the father and the mother's schooling are included in the 
regressions to capture differences in family background. 
The schooling variables of the husband and wife are included to measure 
the intergenerational transfer of human capital wealth and the efficiency of 
household production. For Malaysia, the variables are the number of years 
of schooling completed by the husband and the wife, with means of 5.7 and 3.8 
respectively. Japanese women completed an average of 11.2 years cif schooling. 
Actual years of schooling were unavailable for Japanese husbands; a dummy 
variable equal to one if hegraduated from junior high school serves a proxy.as 
The year of marriage measures the time trend in age at marriage. The mean 
year for both countries is 1961. 
Empirical Results 
Table 4 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions of age at 
marriage in Malaysia using four specifications of the model. In the first 
the husband's and wife's values of time.are imputed from estimatingregression, 
equations given in the Appendix. Variables for the schooling of the husband 
and wife are also included. In the second equation, the wife's schooling 
is omitted. In the third rei:;ression, the imputed wage variables are omitted 
because of a possible high correlation between the wage and schooling. In 
the fourth equation, the schooling variables are omitted. 
The effect of an increase in the wife's wage on her age at marriage is 
negative and significant; the elasticity evaluated at the mean in regressions 
(1) is -.01 and -.008 in regressions (2) and (3). (The wage elasticity is the 
ratio of the percentage change in age to the percentage change in the 
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wage.) Contrary to our expectations, as the value of the wife's t:ime increases, 
for example, due to more schooling and labor market experience, she marries earlier. 
As the husband's wage, an increase in the wife's wage has two effects. First, 
her wage increase raises the cost of her time spent in home production. The effect 
will tend to increase her age at marriage if she spends more time in the home as 
a married woman than as a single woman. Second, the wage increase will raise her 
lifetime income. This effect will increase the benefits of remaining single and 
increase her age at marriage unless her contribution to household income is much 
higher when she is married than when she is single. The net wage effect is theoreti­
cally ambiguous. Our est:imated wage effect is negative, although it is not large; 
doubling the value of t:ime decreases the age at marriage by less than one year. 
The wife's schooling is also a positive determinant of her age at 
marriage. This variable represents an intergenerational transfer of human 
capital as well as efficiency in production outside of marriage. The elasticity 
of age with respect to schooling evaluated at the sample means is approximately 
.02 in regressions (1) and (3). If schooling wer~ to double from the sample 
' 
mean of 3.8 years, age at marriage would increase by an average of approximately 
eight months. 
The husband's wage has a positive effect on the wife's age at marriage. 
The elasticity evaluated at the sample mean is .66 in regressions (1) and (2) 
and .10 in regression (4). If schooling is included, a one percent increase 
in husband's wage reduces the age at marriage by .66 percent. The sign of 
the coefficient is as expected if the negative substitution effect of an increase 
in the value of the husband's time in his household activities outweighs the 
gain that his higher purchasing power will bring to marriage. 
The husband's schooling is a negative determinant of age at marriage 
if the wage variable is included and a positive determinant if it is excluded. 
The elasticity in equations (1) and (2) is -.22, and the elasticity in equation 
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TABLE 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR AGE AT MARRIAGE IN MALAYSIA 
Independent Variable 
Intercept 
in Wife's value of time 
(imputed) 
Wife's schooling 
in husband's hourly wage 
(imputed) 
Husband's schooling 
Residence in market 
center dummy 
Residence in ocher 
urban area dummy 
Wife of Chinese 
origin dummy 
Wife of Indian 
origin dummy 
Year of marriage 
F - Statistic 
R - Square 






















































































bThe wife's age is set equal to zero in the inputed value of time equiition. 
(See DaVanzo, Detray, and Greenberg, 1976). 
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(3) is .02. In the first case, schooling is measuring a wealth and efficiency 
effect separate from the wage effect; an increase in the wealth that he 
brings to the marriage or his efficiency in household production encourages 
an earlier marriage. In the second case, education is. capturing the effect 
of wealth and efficiency as well as the wage effect. 
Age at marriage differs according to area of residence and ethnic 
background. Age at marriage is lower in a market center or urban area than 
in a rural community and is lower for Chinese and Indian women than for Malay 
women, if wages and education are held constant. If wages are not controlled 
for, however, as in equation (3), rural residents and Malays have the lowest 
age at marriage, confirming results obtained in the 1974 l1alaysian Fertility 
and Family Survey. Controlling for economic variables is important in in­
terpreting the effects of residence and ethnicity. These results indicate 
that age at marriage is lower for Malay and rural women because they have 
a lower value of time than non-Malays and urban women. 
Finally, the trend variable--year of marriage--is positive and significant. 
Age at marriage in Malaysia has been increasing over time, controlling for 
changes in wages, wealth, and other socioeconomic variables. 
Table 5 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions for age 
at marriage in Japan using four specifications of th~ model. The wife's and 
husband's schooling alternate with their wages as measures of the value of 
time. (The wife's schooling was not included with her wage since the two varia­
bles are highly collinear.) First, the effect of a change in the wife's value 
of time, measured as her wage or schoolin~, on age at marriage is positive 
and significant--the elasticities evaluated at the mean are approximately 
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.04 in each regression. As in Malaysia, as her time becomes more valuabl~ 
the gains from marriage decrease, and she substitutes time in the market for 
time that she would spend working in the household. 
Second, when the husband's schooling is included as a regressor, his 
income increases the age at marriage. This variable is not a predicted wage 
or value of time but predicted annual earnings and, therefore, includes an 
endogenous labor supply effect which cannot be separated from the wage effect. 
The effect of a change in the husband's level of schooling on age at marriage 
is negative and significant. The elasticity evaluated at the mean is -.02. 
The husband's schooling variable probably captures an efficiency effect as 
well as the negative wealth effect. An increase in his level of schooling, 
will raise his efficiency in household production and unambiguously increase 
the gains to marriage. 
Third, the proxies for the wife's family background--father's income 
and mother's schooling--are positive and significant determinants of the age 
at marriage; the elasticity of age with respect to mother's schooling and the 
elasticity of age with respect to father's income, evaluated at the sample 
means, are .005 and .035 respectively. These results are as expected; the 
more wealthy the home environment, the later the age at marriage. 
Fourth, the year of marriage is a positive determinant of the age 
of marriage. The trend in age at marriage is significantly upwards if we 
control for individual variation in wages and wealth. 
The regression samples used in estimating the age at marriage equations 
include only those women who are currently married. We obviously do not kn°'.' 
16 
TABLE 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR AGE AT MARRIAGE IN JAPAN 
(1110 observations) a 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 








ln Wife's value of time .908 .745 
(imputed) (1.64) (1.40) 




ln Hush and 's Income .801 -.369 1.060 
(imputed) (1.28) (<J.66) (1.84) 














ln Father's Income • 843 .850 .832 .919 
(imputed) (2.14) (2.14) (2.11) (2.34) 








F-statistic 10.26 9.24 10. 23 11.57 
R-square .05 .04 .05 .05 
at-statistics in parentheses. 
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the age at marriage for never-married women. Young women who are currently 
married are not a random sample of their cohort. They have a higher probability 
of ever-marrying then their counterparts; their inclusion in the sample may 
lead to selectivity bias in our results. For the Malaysian sample, no 
correction for selectivity bias can be performed because only ever-married 
women were included in the survey. For the Japanese sample, however, we can 
test for the presence of selectivity bias by analyzing the decision to marry 
itself. The test procedure is outlined in Heckman (1979); we estimate a 
logit model of the decision to marry rather than a probit model. (See Hay 
(1979). Inclusion of the adjustment for selectivity bias results in a 
slight decrease in overall significance of the estimates (e.g. the F-statistic 
for the first specification in Table 5 drops from 10.26 to 9.35). The co­
efficient for the selection variable is itself insignificant, and the remaining 
coefficients change very little. Since there is virtually no evidence of 
selectivity bias, we chose to present the most significant results--those 
uncorrected for this bias--and to ignore the sample selection issue. 
Conclusions 
It is apparent from these regression results that age at marriage in 
Japan and Malaysia does respond significantly to changes in socioeconomic 
variables and that it has been following an exogenous time trend. We found 
a marked difference in the response of age at marriage to changes in the 
value of a woman's time in the two countries. In Malaysia, a higher value 
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of time encouraged an earlier marriage while in Japan a higher value of 
time encouraged a later marriage; both effects were quite small. However, 
the responses to changes in male and female schooling and the husband's 
wage were very similar in both countries; increases in the wife's schooling 
and the husband's wage resulted in later marriage but increases in the husband's 
schooling resulted in earlier marriage. These similarities in response appear 
even more significant given the cultural and developmental diversity between 
Japan and Malaysia. 
There is a significant upward time trend, in both countries. For Malaysia, 
however, this time tr~nd is much steeper than for Japan, with coefficients 
of about 0.15 and 0.06 respectively. This disparity may result in part 
from the very different pace at which these countries are undergoing economic 
development. Rapidly changing social attitudes toward single women may also 
steepen this time trend in Malaysia relative to Japan. 
Characteristics of the wife's background (available for Japan only) 
increase the wife's age at marriage. If her mother has accumulated human 
capital or her father has a large income, income outside of marriage rises, 
reducing the need to marry at an early age. Rural residents experience later 
ages at marriage than urban women, and Malay women experience later ages at 
marriage than Chinese or Indian women (available for Malaysia only). 
We conclude that an understanding of changing social conditions is 
equally important in explaining marriage patterns as isolating an exogenous 
time trend. Increasing labor force participation of women and changing 
attitudes towards the employment of married women have made alternatives 
to marriage much more attractive. We do agree with Hogan that participation 
in time intensive activities--such as regular full-time employment--is a key 
19 
determinant of marriage but find his contention that family background can 
be ignored as unsuitable among Japanese and Malaysian women. Our results 
also support the work of Keeley and Friedan; the value of time and the 
availability of alternative income sources are crucial in determining changes 
at age at marriage. 
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APPENDIX 
ESTIMATING WAGE A..~D INCOME VARIABLES 
As discussed in the text, estimation of the marriage model requires 
measures of the value of the wife's time, the value of the husband's time 
and the female's transferred endowment as proxied by her fatheris income. 
The procedure for measuring the lifetime value of the female's time takes 
into consideration the censoring error of predicting a wage for all women 
based only on the working sub-sample. Since income information was reported 
for the husband and the father only if they were the primary income earner, 
we use instrumental variables predictions for these two income measures. Each 
predicting equation is discussed in turn. 
WIFE'S WAGE 
The measured market wage may understate the true value of time for 
non-working women. Hence the predicted value of the female's time is set 
equal to an instrumental value of the market wage if they are working in the 
paid labor force and to their predicted reservation wage if they are not 
working in the paid labor force. This procedure is based on work by Cogan 
(1975). The lifetime .offered wage W is a function of each woman's level 
0 
of schooling and her labor market experience: 
W = f (schooling, experience) (A.1)
0 0 
Following Mincer (1963), we define the experience variables as 
Experience= Age - Schooling - 6. (A.2) 
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The reservation wage is defined as: 
WR= fR (schooling, husband's income, family (A. 3) 
business, home ownership). 
The choice to participate in the paid labor force in the current period 
relies on a conparison of the reservation wage with the offered wage. 
In order to estimate the parameters of the participation and wage functions, 
we must first specify functional forms and stochastic structures: 
(A.4) 
lnWR = 8Rl + 8R2 Schooling+ 8R) husband's income+ (A. 5)8R4 
family business+ SRS home ownership+ ER 
where E and ER are independent and identically distributed Weibull errors.0 
The probability. of labor force participation (Pi) is then : 
(A.6) 
The parameters of the participation function may now be estimated with a 
logit technique since ER - E has a logistic distribut_ion (McFadden (1975)).
0 
Given the parameters of the market wage, estimated by OLS, we may then identify 
the reservation wage function. These estimates are presented in Table 
A.l for Malaysia and A.2 for Japan. 
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Table A.1. Estimated Equations for Predicting the Value of Time: Malaysia 
. a 




Years of Wife's 
Schooling 













Wife of Chinese 
Origin Dummy 















































Sample size is 1170 households. 
b t-statistics are asymptotic 
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Table A.2. Estimated Equations for Predicting the Value of Time: Japan 





















aSample size is 1110 households. 
b t-statistics are asymptotic 
































cFifteen percent of all women are working. 
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HUSBAND'S INCOME 
The predicting equation for the husband's income is based on a 
linear model in which the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of 
annual earnings, is regressed on three dummy variables indicating the 
highest level of schooling which the husband completed, and a set of 
dummy variables describing the husband's occupation. Since the husband's 
age is not reported, the wife's age serves as a proxy. A dummy variable, 
equal to one if the husband has ever been unemployed represents disruption 
in work experience. Table A.3 presents the results for Malaysia and 
Table A.4 contains the results for Japan. 
FATHER'S INCOME 
The father's income is reported only for those Japanese women whose 
fathers are the primary income earner. Table A.5 presents the predicting 
equation based on the available sample information. The model for the 
Japanese father is similar to that for the husband. A variable equal 
to one if the father completed college represents the father's schooling. 
Dummy variables for seven occupational categories are also included. 
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Table A.3. Estimates for Predicting the Husband's Value of Time: Malaysia 
(882 observations) 
Independent
Variables Means Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant .876 5.164 
Husband's Experience 27.217 .029 2.999 
Husband's Experience 883.92 -2.360--000373
Squared 
Huband's Schooling 5. 776 .106 12.036 
Husband of Chinese .384 .434 7.266
Origin-Dummy 
Husband of Indian .123 .164 1.920
Origin-Dummy 
Urban Dummy .213 .382 5.473 
Market Center
Dummy .210 .405 5.481 
F-statistic 66.59 
R-Square, • 346 
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Table A.4. Estimates for Predicting the Husgand's Income: Japan 
(918 Observations) 
Independent
Variables Means Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 13.9613 232.26 
Ever unemployed (yes=l) 0.06 -0.1494 -2.91 
High School 0.38 0.1558 4.88 
Technical School or
Junior College 0.11 0.2006 4 .31 
College 0.24 0.3291 7.76 
Wife's Age 37.23 0.007744 5.59 
Occupational Variables 
Self-employed 0.19 .3033 8.46 
Professional 0.09 .1238 2.38 
Manager 0.07 .4282 7.75 
Salary man, large firm 0.16 .2125 5.n9 
Salary man, ~mall firm 0.11 .1371 3.06 




Table A.5. Estimates for Predicting the Father's Income: Japan 
(72 Observations) 
Independent
Variables Means Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 14.9156 75.24 
College 0.17 .1768 1.01 
Farmer 0.14 -.5442 -2.25 
Self-employed 0.24 -.09706 -0.45 
Manager 0.07 -.1705 -0.63 
Salary man, large firm 0.14 -.3225 -1.42 
Salary man, small firm 0.07 -.1919 -0.69 
Blue collar, large· firm 0.11 -.3936 -1.57 
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